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Kim Il-Sung’s Korean People’s Restoration Army

Uiheang Hur

Abstract
This paper concentrates on two specific Korean independence movements to analyze if they can be
defined as terrorist groups. It is a very controversial
and emotionally sensitive topic of discussion within
South Korean society. The two selected groups are
the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) and the
Korean People’s Restoration Army. The historical
context in which the two groups emerged will be explained in detail, since a clear historical context must
be provided to help the reader achieve a good understanding of Korea’s unique historical setting. The two
groups will then be analyzed in the light of political analyst Bruce Hoffman’s definition of terrorism

and the distinction between old and new terrorism
and state-sponsored terrorism. The groups’ endings
will be dealt with by some of the ideas set forward
by Audrey Cronin. The paper will end with a brief
case study on George Washington to see if he can be
defined as a terrorist. A comparison between George
Washington and Kim Ku of the KPG shows how
emotionally, and intellectually, it is uncomfortable
to consider the Korean freedom fighters as terrorists.
History is written by the victors. I accept the international norm of terrorism, first to create a starting
point for an alternative view to the characterization
of the KPG as a terrorist group.

Introduction
In 2007, a British professor described the last leader
of the Korean Provisional Government, Kim Ku, as
a terrorist (The Korea Herald, August 29). South Korean students refuted this description, but the British professor did not understand the problem. South
Korean people still remember the brutal colonial rule
of Japan during the 20th century; the scars are still
healing. A non-Korean individual may ask why such
anger is still present in the 21st century. The answer is
that colonization only ended a few decades ago when
South Korean grand- or great-grandparents were still
young. Much as it would be intellectually and emotionally uncomfortable for American people to char-
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acterize George Washington as a terrorist, it is also
difficult for South Koreans to characterize their heroes and patriots as terrorists. Nevertheless, it is true
that many of the Korean independence movements
did involve violence that Hoffman would define as
terrorism. In particular, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) and the Korean People’s Restoration
Army (KPRA), selected for case studies, can be defined as terrorists according to Hoffman’s definition.
It is emotionally uncomfortable to accept the definition, but it is intellectually necessary to acknowledge
an established international norm.
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Historical Context
Japanese Colonization of the Korean
Peninsula

Thus, the agreement allowed Japan to occupy the Korean peninsula as a result of the Russo-Japanese War.

Until the 19th Century, the Chosun Empire, under
the rule of Lee Dynasty, governed the Korean peninsula for five hundred years. In the late 1800s, Chosun opened up some of their ports to foreign trade.
Because of the geopolitical location between China
and Japan, the abundance in underdeveloped natural resources and large population size, numerous
strong states began to extend their influences into
Korean peninsula including the United States, the
United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Japan. Three of
these states were particularly interested in maximizing their power over the Korean peninsula—Russia,
China, and Japan. Nevertheless, during this period,
China was politically unstable with its own civil conflicts and therefore, their policies toward Korea were
insignificant in the beginning. Within two decades
of Korea opening some ports, the Russo-Japanese
War erupted. Japan had long been interested in occupying the Korean peninsula ever since the 1500s,
and had already carried out two invasions that almost
succeeded in destroying the Korean empires. In July
1905, the Taft-Katsura Agreement was made between
the Japanese government and U.S. government. U.S.
President Roosevelt concluded that, “Japanese control over Korea was an appropriate means to prevent
the further expansion of Russian power” (Yi 309).

In September 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth officially ended the Russo-Japanese War and Japan was
victorious. Japan consequently proceeded with their
imperialism to occupy the Korean peninsula, forcing
the Chosun Emperor Kojong to sign the Protectorate
Treaty on November 17, 1905. The Treaty allowed
the Japanese parliament to send a governor general
to take full authority over all of the Chosun’s foreign
relations. It completely destroyed Chosun’s standing
in the international community as an independent
state. Following this, the Japanese government took
over the Chosun government and General Governor
Ito Hirobumi was titled the chief executive.
In October 1909, An Joong Keun, a young Korean
nationalist, assassinated Ito Hirobumi using a gun. It
was the first major Korean nationalist violence as an
attempt to protect the nation from the Japanese colonization. In August 1910, the last Korean Emperor,
Soonjong, was forced to abdicate from the throne
and yield the country to the Japanese parliament.
The Chosun Empire officially collapsed (from here
on, ‘Korea’ is used instead). The Treaty of Annexation
that extinguished Korea as an international personality was signed (Simons 125) and the Japanese annexation of Korea was complete (Yi 313).

The Rise of Korean Independence Movements
Between 1910 and 1919, the Korean people formed
some peasant-based movements to liberate the country. The major event that sparked the rise of Korean
nationalism occurred when the U.S. President Wilson declared his Fourteen Points, which enunciated
the doctrine of self-determination (Lee 101). The
idea of self-determination stimulated the passions of
educated Korean students and religious leaders.

were all rejected by the Western powers. They were
not interested in giving the Korean people self-determination.
As a result, various religious organizations including
Christians and Buddhists decided to proclaim Korean independence to attain international support.
These organizations sent their representatives to sign
the Korean Declaration of Independence in Seoul.
On March 1, 1919, thirty-three Koreans officially
promulgated the Declaration of Independence in the
center streets of Seoul. A massive street demonstration followed, led by Korean students who shouted,
“Taehan tongnip manse!” (“Long live Korean Independence!”). The news of the Declaration of Independence spread out to the whole peninsula and

However, when Japanese rule did not end after World
War I, Korean nationalism for self-determination
quickly increased. The Korean patriots in exile organized the New Korea Youth Association in Shanghai
and sent its representative to Paris Peace Conference
in 1919 to appeal for Korean independence. A few
other similar cases followed. However, these appeals
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2014/iss1/6
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stirred more than two million Koreans to join the
street demonstration (Yi 344).

was strong, and consequently, these demonstrations,
known now as the March First Movement, “failed to
win the support of the Western powers” (Yi 344).
The last resort of peaceful struggle for independence
had failed. Such failure led to the formation of numerous independence movements in Korea, Manchuria, and China. Among them were the Korean
Provisional Government in Shanghai and the Korean
People’s Restoration Army of Kim Il-Sung.

However, these peaceful demonstrations were brutally crushed by the Japanese police forces, army,
and the navies that arrested 46,948, killed 7,509,
and injured 15,961 Korean demonstrators (Yi 344).
Nevertheless, the Western powers remained quiet
toward such inhumane repression. After World War
I, Japan’s standing in the international community

Case Study 1:
The Korean Provisional Government: Is it a terrorist group?
ter, Shigemisu Mamoru, and many other Japanese
government officials.

Characteristics
In April 1919, the Korean Provisional Government
of the Republic of Korea (Taehan Minguk Imsi
Chongbu, the KPG) was established in Shanghai.
The KPG was a structural government that imposed
democracy, electing officers such as the Premier (Syngman Rhee) and the Ministers of various departments. Between 1919 and 1925, the KPG actively
sought foreign support through diplomatic means.
Premier Syngman Rhee put in his best effort to sway
U.S. support for Korea’s liberation.. However, their
appeals once again failed to gain the interests of the
Western powers.

Terrorism by Definition
Was the KPG a terrorist organization? Bruce Hoffman laid out his definition of terrorism by providing
five criteria by which to determine acts as terrorism.
The criteria follow as such: Terrorism is:
1) ineluctably political in aims and motives, 2) violent—or, equally important,
threatens violence, 3) designed to have
far-reaching psychological repercussions
beyond the immediate victim or target,
4) conducted either by an organization
with an identifiable chain of command
or conspiratorial cell structure…5) perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity (Hoffman 40).

In 1926, Syngman Rhee lost the support of the members of the KPG and was ousted. Afterwards, Rhee
stayed in the U.S., naming himself the representative
of all the Korean revolutionaries. In 1926, Kim Ku
was elected as the next President of the KPG. He was
a rightist revolutionary who had been a prominent
freedom fighter since the late 19th century. Kim Ku
was one of the more aggressive revolutionaries and
he directed several cases of violence for the first time
after the establishment of the KPG.

First, the KPG certainly had political aims and motives. The primary reason for the KPG’s establishment was because, “a government was needed in
order to obtain public support at home and abroad
and to prepare…attaining independence” (Lee 130).
By 1919, there was no Korean government; it was
extinct with the annexation of the country. Thus,
even though the legitimacy of the KPG is very controversial, the leaders of the March First Movement
attempted to establish a rightful Korean government
for the Korean people while in exile.

In 1932, Kim Ku directed two events that could be
labeled as terrorist actions. First, on January 8, 1932,
a young member of the KPG, Yi Pong-Chang, threw
a hand grenade at the Japanese emperor outside the
Sakurada Gate of the palace in Tokyo. The attempt
failed and Yi Pong-Chang was sentenced to death.
The second took place later that year on April 29.
Another member of the KPG, Yun Pong-gil, threw
a bomb in Shanghai at a large-scale military parade.
The explosion seriously injured the Japanese minisPublished by KnightScholar, 2015

Second, the KPG began to use violence into the
1930s. Two of the main reasons that the KPG chose
to use terrorist tactics were the increasing domina60
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tion of the Japanese Empire in Northeast Asia as well
as the 1931 Korean massacre of Chinese people in
Korea. On July 1931, some Koreans massacred many
Chinese residents in the Korean peninsula and destroyed their property.

tablished, accepted international perspective about a
legitimate statehood.
According to this definition, the KPG was a government in exile without a population and territory to
protect and represent. The Korean population and
the territory were under the direct control of the
Japanese colonial government in Korea. It can be argued that the Japanese rule in Korea was illegitimate.
However, according to the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the Protectorate Treaty, and
the Annexation Treaty are accepted as international
law. Treaty is accepted as “an international agreement
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law” (Henderson 65). Therefore, even though the Protectorate Treaty and the
Annexation Treaty were signed under the oppression
of Japan, the treaties unfairly gave the Japanese rule
over Korea legitimacy. Furthermore, it is important
to understand that the international concept of colonialism was alive at this point of history. Most of
the major powers had their own colonial empires;
hence, the Japanese occupation of Korea would not
have been seen as exceptional from the international
society back then. In short, the KPG was a non-state
entity and because it eventually used terrorist tactics
to further their goals, the KPG turned into a terrorist
group into the 1930s under such a frustrating historical context.

The cause of the massacre was due to exaggerated reports of a dispute between some Korean and Chinese
farmers. This degraded the attitude of the Chinese
public towards the KPG in Shanghai; it became much
more hostile and suspicious environment against the
KPG. On the other hand, some Japanese troops attacked Chinese troops in Mukden in December. It
signaled to the KPG that the Korean nationalists
engaging in independence movements in Manchuria might face extinction if the Japanese troops successfully occupied Manchuria. Within such context,
Kim Ku commanded the two terrorist plans in 1932
to fight back against the Japanese expansion and
hopefully regain the support of the Chinese public.
Third, the bombings targeted the symbols of Japanese
expansionism, the Emperor, and the government officials. These symbols were specifically targeted to
show that the KPG was fighting against the Japanese
colonization in Korea. It was certainly expecting to
bring about a larger goal than merely assassinating
the targets—that of Korean independence. Although
it is unclear how other members of the KPG were
involved in organizing the two bombings, Hoffman’s
fourth criteria is satisfied by the command of the
KPG’s leader, Kim Ku.

It is important to note that the KPG was not organized to perpetrate terrorist acts. In fact, Kim Ku necessarily directed the two terrorist tactics, because the
KPG “carried on a tenuous existence in the shadow
of the Kuomintang” (Paige 20) in Shanghai. The
matter was concerned with the group’s survival, as
well as the achievement of their ultimate goal. The
KPG was an independence movement, pursuing a
national independence. That is why the group started
as a structurally democratic government, which did
eventually perpetrate terrorism because of the historical context it existed under. Therefore, it is incorrect
to characterize the KPG to similar, modern, terrorist
groups, such as al-Qaeda. The two groups are significantly different in their motivations for perpetrating
terrorism. For al-Qaeda, they have the “obligation to
wage war against the far enemy…whenever possible”
(Booth and Dunne 52), which suggests that the main
purpose of organizing the group was to perpetrate
terrorism.

Last, was the KPG a subnational group or a non-state
entity? It was certainly a subnational group. There is
confusion as to whether the KPG should be regarded
as a state or not. The definition of ‘state’ as accepted
by the international community follows:
The state is a sovereign actor with a central government that rules over a population and territory and protects and represents that population in international
politics (Henderson 28).
This is offered by the 1933 Montevideo Convention.
Although the convention was held after the establishment of the KPG, the definition of statehood
accepted by the current international society is the
definition set by the Montevideo Convention. Thus,
it is unavoidable to look into history from the eshttps://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2014/iss1/6
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On the other hand, the KPG partially represented
old terrorism. There are two key features that distinguish old terrorism from new terrorism, according
to Hoffman. First, old terrorist groups used old media, which was used to attract attention to the group’s
cause (Hoffman 194). The KPG had their own newspaper publisher, the Independence News, which was
used to share information and bring nationalism to
the Korean patriots in Korea, China, and Hawaii (Simons 136).

as ordinary citizens. It is possible that Syngman Rhee
was not keen on accepting his former political rivals
as esteemed freedom fighters in his newly established
country, Republic of Korea. The KPG was thus disbanded, and it failed to develop into a legitimate Korean government after liberation.
According to Audrey Cronin, when terrorism succeeds “it yields benefits for those on whose behalf it
is undertaken” (Cronin 74). It suggests that although
Korean independence was not achieved by the KPG’s
struggle, the Korean people still benefited from the
liberation itself and therefore, the core reason for
the KPG’s struggle for independence was satisfied.
Furthermore, the KPG seems to have achieved their
strategic aim, but not tactical aims. Audrey Cronin
claims that “most organizations have used terrorism as a means to achieve either short-term, tactical
(proximate) aims or long-term, strategic (ultimate)
goals” (Cronin 77). For the KPG, the short-term,
tactical aim of perpetrating the first terrorist act
would have been assassinating the Japanese emperor,
which failed. However, the KPG was not an organization established for violent motivations. The core
goal of the group (the long-term strategic goal) was
national independence, which did eventually occur.
Therefore, it would be partially correct to claim that
the KPG’s strategic goal was achieved. It would not
be fully correct to say so, because Korean liberation
was achieved by the Japanese surrender to the Allies
after the U.S. nuclear bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and not by the KPG’s nationalist activities.

Second, the KPG was active before the hijacking of
the Israeli commercial flight in 1968, which Hoffman
indicates as the end line of old terrorism. Hoffman
argues that the event allowed the terrorists to realize
that the “operations perpetrated in countries other
than their own…were a reliable means of attracting
attention to themselves and their cause” (Hoffman
64), which eventually led to the internationalization
of their activities. The KPG did indeed hope for the
internationalization of their goal; however, the group
did not use terrorism to achieve it.

The Ending of the KPG
Upon the liberation of Korea on August 15, 1945,
the main goal of the KPG had disappeared. However, the legitimacy of the KPG as a rightful government was rejected by the Allied Powers and instead,
the Republic of Korea was established with Syngman
Rhee as the founding father. Hence, when the leaders of the KPG, including Kim Ku, had to return to
Korea on November 29, 1945, they were recognized

Case Study 2:
Kim Il-Sung and his Korean People’s Restoration Army
Characteristics
The Korean Communist Party was first established in
Seoul in 1925. However, it ceased to exist by 1928
because of the strong repression by Japanese police
forces (Paige 19). Many members of the Community
Party fled to Manchuria, where they set up guerilla
groups, one of which a communist freedom fighter,
Kim Il-Sung joined. In September 1931, the Japanese troops invaded Manchuria, which threatened
the Korean guerilla fighters. In response, Kim Il-

Published by KnightScholar, 2015

Sung, organized the Anti-Japanese People’s Guerrilla
Army (AJPGA) in early 1932.
The AJPGA was reorganized into the Korean People’s Restoration Army (the KPRA) in March 1934.
The main goal of the KPRA was “to overthrow the
colonial rule of Japanese imperialism in Korea and
bring national independence and social emancipation to the Korean people” (Simons 143). Until the
early 1940s, Kim Il-Sung led the KPRA and engaged
in several guerilla warfare attacks against the Japanese
62
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troops and police forces at Taipingkou, Lao-heishan,
and Shantungtun (Simons 144). During the 1930s,
the Chinese Communist Party commanded many of
Kim Il-Sung’s anti-Japanese guerilla activities. Into
the 1940s, Japanese expansionism strengthened and

Japanese forces marched into China’s territory. In response to this, Kim Il-Sung and the KPRA moved
into the Soviet Union for protection, where the group
was supported by the Soviet Union to continue fighting against the Japanese forces.

Terrorism by Definition
In light of Hoffman’s definition, Kim Il-Sung was
a terrorist. Through the KPRA, Kim Il-Sung used
violence to achieve the liberation of Korea, guerilla
tactics to consistently shake the Japanese colonial
rule in Korea, and the KPRA was definitely a nonstate entity. The KPRA can be seen as an insurgency.
Audrey Cronin says, “to assert terrorist organizations
and insurgencies can be neatly distinguished would
be foolish” (Cronin 153), which suggests that there
are not many differences between an insurgency and
a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, the KPRA’s activities are similar to those of the Ethniki Organosis
Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) of Cyprus that is considered to represent old terrorism. The KPRA used
guerilla tactics, but not a full-scale war, which was
also widely utilized by the EOKA to fight against the
British troops.Moreover, Hoffman’s second category
says, “terrorism is violent—or, equally important,
threatens violence” (Hoffman 40). The existence of
the KPRA under the Japanese colonial rule threatened to use violence against the Japanese authori-

ties—which was certainly terrorism from a Japanese
perspective. The KPRA was so efficient that when
they expanded their activities to a general offensive
throughout the country, it was expected that “the
whole of Korea would have fallen to Kim Il-Sung
in August 1945” (Simons 151) if the foreign powers
had not engaged Korea.
The KPRA was supported by the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. This can be characterized as state-sponsored terrorism. China and the
Soviet Union were both threatened by Japanese expansionism. Therefore, their support for Kim Il-Sung
and the KPRA can be understood as state-sponsored
terrorism from Hoffman’s description, because Hoffman claims that states may “embrace terrorism as
a deliberate instrument of foreign policy: a cost-effective means of waging war covertly…” (Hoffman
258). With this view in mind, China and the Soviet
Union were utilizing the KPRA as an instrument to
oppress the Japan’s expansionism from inside the territorial jurisdiction of Japan.

The Ending of the KPRA
The ending of the KPRA was similar to the KPG’s
ending, in that the KPRA’s main goal of Korean independence was indirectly achieved with the surrender
of the Japanese emperor. However, the KPRA was
not disbanded, unlike the KPG. After the surrender
of the Japanese emperor in August 15, 1945, there
were some Japanese troops who rejected the return
to Japan and had ambitions to continue the Japanese
imperialism. The Soviet Red Army and the KPRA
cooperatively fought against the last Japanese troops
in northern Korea. Afterwards, with the support of
the Soviet Union, Kim Il-Sung founded the Central
Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of
North Korea, which established the structural foundation for the development of North Korea.

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2014/iss1/6

In February 1946, the North Korean Provisional
People’s Committee was established with Kim IlSung as chairman, which became the People’s Committee of North Korea a year after. By September
1948, Kim Il-Sung was no longer a terrorist. He was
the Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. Thus, Kim Il-Sung achieved statehood, which
he built using the foundations of the KPRA. Since
terrorism must be perpetrated by a non-state entity,
Kim Il-Sung and the KPRA were no longer terrorists
and thus, their terrorism came to an end.Nevertheless, it may be argued that North Korea is now perpetrating terrorism on its own people. Cronin argues
that “when they deliberately target innocents…that
behavior is wrong and…is ‘terrorism’” (Cronin 164),
which can be used to argue that the current North
Korean regime’s suppression over their citizens using
63
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indoctrinations, cult of personality, and various restrictions in the lives of the innocent North Korean
people can be characterized as terrorism. Therefore,
to a certain extent, the terrorism that had begun with

Kim Il-Sung’s independence movement during the
Japanese colonial era seems to have passed down the
generation to this day.

Understanding the South Korean public’s emotional discomfort in
characterizing the KPG as a terrorist group
international society regarding terrorism, George
Washington may well be a terrorist.

Was George Washington a terrorist?
George Washington (1732-1799) became the first
President of the United States of America after six
years of leading the Continental Army against British rule on the American continent. He is respected
by the American people as the founding father of the
country. According to Dr. Victoria Farmer, George
Washington can be defined as a terrorist (October
25, 2013). However, it would be very uncomfortable
for the American public to acknowledge that Washington may fit into Hoffman’s definition of terrorism.

However, the general view of George Washington is
that he is not a terrorist. Moreover, I personally do
not consider George Washington as a terrorist. Thus,
if the KPG and Kim Ku are perceived from a similar point of view, I believe it would be easier for the
American people to sympathize with the South Korean public when it comes to deal with the definitional
dilemma. It is socially difficult to recognize people
who fought for our rightful freedom, the rightful
Wilsonian self-determination, as terrorists.

First, George Washington’s Continental Army was
driven by political aims and motives to oust British rule in America. Second, George Washington’s
Continental army did use violence, and did threaten
violence by its very existence against the British authority. Third, the various attacks the Continental
Army launched against the British were aiming for
the independence of American people, rather than
merely defeating the British troops in certain regions.
Fourth, the Continental Army was a very well organized group of militants under the leadership of
George Washington, and the support of the Continental Congress. Last, the Continental Army was
certainly a non-state entity. By Hoffman’s definition,
which is definitely widely accepted by the current

The main reason that George Washington is respected as a hero is because he successfully ousted the British rule from America and attained the statehood of
his nation. Is it not similar to how Kim Il-Sung used
the KPRA to establish the statehood of North Korea? Nevertheless, we do not consider Kim Il-Sung
and George Washington equally as heroes. They are
almost the two contradicting political figures in history. As such, if Kim Ku had been successful in his
leadership as the president of the KPG and achieved
Korean independence, Korean history would be different. The KPG would not be considered as a terrorist group anymore, because it would then be considered as the foundation for the Republic of Korea
by the current history.

Conclusion
Because of its geopolitical location, Korea has experienced many tragedies throughout history. During
Japanese colonialism, numerous Koreans stood up to
protect their country from being annihilated by Japan. Among those Koreans were strong leaders, such
as Kim Ku and Kim Il-Sung, who organized separate
independence movements in different forms.
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Kim Ku’s Korean Provisional Government started off
as a democratic institution without legitimacy. But it
eventually used some terrorist tactics for the survival
of the group and the desperate desire for national independence. On the other hand, Kim Il-Sung started
off as a terrorist. His Korean People’s Restoration
Army was a guerilla militant group, which used similar tactics to those used by the EOKA in Cyprus.
However, even though the two sides were active dur64
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ing the same time period, and for the same cause, the
KPG and the KPRA ended differently. The KPG was
disbanded upon the liberation of Korea for failing to
attain acknowledgement from foreign powers as the
legitimate government of Korea. The KPRA on the
other hand, achieved statehood under the leadership
of Kim Il-Sung, and large support from the Soviet
Union.

It is always difficult to acknowledge the heroes of independence as terrorists. For us South Koreans, considering Kim Ku as a terrorist is exactly the same as
when Americans have to accept the fact that George
Washington can also be defined as a terrorist. However, it would be important to accept what has been
set up by the international norm to function as an independent state, with good standing, and effectively
assert for our legitimate rights in the international
society.
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